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PROTECTING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND
DEFAMATION DEFENDANTS: A TWO-TIERED
ANALYSIS -AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES
"A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN"
[P]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms. Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, govern-
ment may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.
When one must guess what conduct or utterances may lose him
his position, one necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful
zone. Threat of sanctions may deter almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment's freedom of speech clause gives each citizen an
equal right to self expression and to participation in self-government.2
However, in the areas of public employees' first amendment rights and def-
amation law, certain citizens are not given equal freedom of speech rights.3
Currently, if a public employee's speech is not a "matter of public con-
1. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967) (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459-63 (1980)
(picketing regulation which prohibited some picketing activity but allowed other types of pick-
eting, based on content of such picketing, violated first amendment); Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (same); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (Freedom of
speech "is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us ...."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(legislation specifically directed at those who use speech to advocate violent and unlawful over-
throw of government upheld as constitutional because regulation was narrowly tailored and
aimed at serious evil).
3. See infra notes 24-32 & 180-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
public employees' freedom of speech rights are given less protection than other citizens' free-
dom of speech rights. See also infra notes 33-37 & 240-52 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion on how the freedom of speech rights of defamation defendants accused of defaming
private individuals are accorded less first amendment protection than other citizens are
accorded.
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cern," 4 he may be subject to a retaliatory discharge based solely upon his
speech.5 Likewise, in the area of defamation law,' if the defendant's speech
is not a matter of public concern, he may be subject to presumed and puni-
tive damages in suits brought under state libel law.'
The Supreme Court first confronted the public concern issue in 1983,
in Connick v. Myers.8 The main issue in Connick was whether a public
employee could be discharged solely on the basis of her speech.9 In settling
the issue, the Supreme Court determined that the first amendment prohibits
the discharge of public employees when their speech addresses a matter of
public concern. 10 To determine what statements constitute a matter of pub-
lic concern, courts must examine the content, form, and context of the
statement as revealed by the whole record."
Two years after the Connick decision, the Supreme Court again
confronted the public concern issue. This time, the question before the
Court concerned the extent to which the first amendment limited the
awarding of presumed and punitive damages in defamation actions brought
by private individuals."2 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
4. For a definition of what constitutes a "matter of public concern," see infra note 11
and accompanying text.
5. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
6. In defamation actions, the plaintiff's burden of proof depends upon whether he is a
public official, public figure, or private individual. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official plaintiff must prove "actual malice" in order to
prevail); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) ("actual malice" standard ap-
plies to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (private plaintiff
must only prove fault in order to prevail). For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 212-
37 and accompanying text. The main focus of this note is on defamation actions brought by
private figure plaintiffs.
7. Punitive damages have been defined as damages given to the plaintiff over and
above the full compensation for injuries. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER
& KEETON]. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, to teach the defend-
ant not to repeat his conduct, and to deter others from following the defendant's behavior. Id.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). Prior to Dun &
Bradstreet, a private figure plaintiff only had to prove fault in order to recover damages. Gertz,
418 U.S. at 347-50. However, the plaintiff could not recover presumed and punitive damages
unless he showed actual malice as defined by New York Times. Id. In Dun & Bradstreet, the
Supreme Court held that when the speech involved does not address a matter of public con-
cern, a private figure plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages even absent a
showing of actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761. For a discussion of the various
types of damages allowed in defamation actions, see infra note 205 and accompanying text.
8. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For a more detailed discussion of Connick, see infra notes
164-95 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 140.
10. Id. at 147.
11. Id. at 147-48.
12. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985). For a
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Builders,13 the Supreme Court held that presumed and punitive damages
could be awarded to a private individual upon a lesser showing of fault
when the speech involved does not address a matter of public concern. 14
Again, the statement's content, form, and context controlled the issue re-
garding what constitutes a matter of public concern.15 Thus, in both areas
of the law, public employees' first amendment rights and defamation law,
the Court focused its inquiry on whether the speech addressed a matter of
public concern and it ruled that this depended upon the statement's content,
form, and context.
Although the labeling of a particular statement as a matter of public
concern or purely private speech"6 is critical to the public employee17 and
the defamation defendant, the Supreme Court failed to devise a clear stan-
dard for the lower courts to work with in making these critical determina-
tions.1 8 In devising the content, form, and context standard, the Court re-
fused to elaborate on the meaning of the terms: content, form, and context;
and intentionally avoided establishing any type of guidelines.19 Conse-
more detailed discussion of Dun & Bradstreet, see infra notes 239-62 and accompanying text.
13. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
14. Id. at 761.
15. Id.
16. Purely private speech has been defined as "speech solely in the individual interest
of the speaker." Id. at 762.
17. This note only addresses first amendment rights of public employees. For an excel-
lent summary and comparison of public employees' rights to private employees' rights, see
Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 42 (1987).
18. The current standard states: "[w]hether ... speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as re-
vealed by the whole record." Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 147-48 (1983). See Langvardt, Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doc-
trine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 21 VAL. U.L. REv. 241, 259 (1987) ("[T]he
Court [in Dun & Bradstreet] failed to set forth any meaningful standard to guide the making
of such determinations [of whether speech touched upon a matter of public concern]."); Com-
ment, Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss: Cutting Away the Protective Mantle of Gertz, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 1171, 1194 (1986) ("Although Justice Powell purported to determine whether
the credit report implicated a matter of public concern by evaluating its 'content, form, and
context ... as revealed by the entire record,' his conclusory application of this test did not
explain what elements are involved in these criteria and how much weight is to be given to
each.").
19. See generally Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, the
Supreme Court explicitly declined to formulate a precise standard. Justice Marshall, writing
for the majority, specifically stated:
Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by teach-
ers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appro-
priate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such state-
ments may be judged.
Id. at 569. This statement was reiterated in Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
1989]
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quently, the standard is inherently vague.
The current standard's inherent vagueness and lack of guidelines20
leads to self censorship and undue caution on behalf of public employees
and would-be speakers.2 Moreover, the current standard does not give pub-
lic employees and would-be speakers adequate notice with respect to what
topics are appropriate for discussion. If the first amendment is to fulfill its
historic function," a more explicative standard for determining whether
20. See generally Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49 (for the Court's application of the con-
tent, form, and context standard to the facts of the case); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761-63 (1985) (same). In both cases, the Court merely stated the
standard and applied it to the facts on hand. In neither case did the Court give any indication
as to how the standard was applied or enunciate any specific guidelines as to how the standard
was to be applied in future cases. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at
761-63.
21. See generally Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 790 (unrestrained presumed and pu-
nitive damages have a chilling potential); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964) (discussing self-censorship and the tendency to only make statements which "steer far
wider of the unlawful zone"); Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Scope of Protected
Speech for Public Employees, 5 BRIDGEPORT L.R. 337, 361 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Nar-
rowing the Scope] (the standard will induce silence and chill the expression of public employ-
ees); Note, Connick v. Myers: New Restrictions on the Free Speech Rights of Government
Employees, 60 IND. L.J. 339, 340 (1985) [hereinafter Note, New Restrictions] (the uncertain
standard "will undoubtedly chill a significant amount of constructive criticism of official be-
havior" by public employees).
22. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-A New Twist to the Law of Defama-
tion-Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 527, 528-29
(1986) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Law] (the standard will cause difficulty in predicting
what statements will subject the speaker to presumed and punitive damages); Note, New Re-
strictions, supra note 21, at 339-40 ("The inconsistent decisions that will inevitably result
from such a subjective inquiry will fail to provide adequate notice to employees as to what
topics are appropriate for discussion within a governmental agency."); Note, First Amend-
ment-Defamation-Private Individual May Recover Presumed and Punitive Damages With-
out a Showing of Actual Malice-Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 2939 (1985), 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 785, 809 (1986) [hereinafter Note, First Amend-
ment] (the standard does not provide any clear guidelines); Note, A Delicate Balance: Public
Employment v. Freedom of Speech, 17 U. WEST L.A.L. REv. 81, 100 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Delicate Balance] (public employees will be unable to predict what conduct is accept-
able as a result of the "amorphous standard").
23. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Justice Brandeis expressed the historical significance of the first amendment as follows:
Those who won our independence believed ... that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They rec-
ognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repres-
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force
in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 10
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speech addresses a matter of public concern must be established.
Public employees are uniquely qualified to provide the public with in-
formation concerning the manner in which government is or should be oper-
ated. " Since public employees observe the machinations of government on
a daily basis, they can contribute more informed opinions concerning
whether public institutions are accomplishing their intended tasks.2 5 How-
ever, because of the inherent vagueness of the content, form, and context
standard, public employees must exercise an inordinate amount of caution
in discussing matters critical to self-government. 6 Thus, despite a national
commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public is-
sues, 27 those citizens most qualified to contribute to the debate,2 8 public
employees, are often silenced for fear of retaliatory discharge.2 9
The implications of suppressing the thoughts and ideas of public em-
ployees are staggering.30 Additionally, silencing public employees' criticism
of the government's internal operations deprives the public of one of its
most valuable sources of enlightenment.3 1 Finally, the inherent vagueness of
the content, form, and context standard may even discourage qualified indi-
amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Id. See also infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text for a general discussion on the history
of the first amendment. But cf. Borke, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) ("The Framers seemed to have no coherent theory of free
speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with the subject.").
24. See generally Rees, The First Amendment, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 187, 189 (1985)
("[S]uch persons [public employees] are likely to be unusually well informed on matters in
which the public may have an interest in the fullest possible disclosure and debate."); Note,
Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 361 (asserting that "employee criticism of the admin-
istration of public services is just as likely to increase its efficiency") (footnote omitted); Note,
New Restrictions, supra note 21, at 339 (discussing public employees' unique qualifications to
give informed opinions).
25. See generally Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 361 (the comments of
public employees on the administration of public services are a valuable resource).
26. Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at 339. See also Note, Narrowing the
Scope, supra note 21, at 361 (the standard induces silence).
27. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
28. The manner in which government is operated or should be operated is undoubtedly
a public issue. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
29. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983). In Connick, the Supreme Court held
that public employers can fire public employees, without any first amendment implications, if
the employee's speech does not address "a matter of public concern." Id.
30. In June 1983, the number of persons employed by all levels of government was
approximately 15% of the civilian labor force. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 405, 425 (1984). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 563 (1971) (any restrictions placed on such a significant portion of
society should be a matter of grave concern); Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at
360-61 ("The federal, state and local governments of the United States constitute the single
largest source of employment in the nation.").
31. Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 361.
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viduals from seeking government employment.8 2
Likewise, in the area of defamation law, would-be speakers are unnec-
essarily deterred from contributing to the public marketplace of ideas be-
cause of the inherent vagueness as to what statements constitute a matter of
public concern.33 Under the current standard, if a speaker defames a pri-
vate individual34 and the court finds that the subject matter of the speech is
not a matter of public concern,8 5 the speaker subjects himself to unlimited
liability in the form of presumed and punitive damages. 6 Thus, as a result
of the lack of clarity concerning what constitutes a matter of public con-
cern, the potential of unrestricted presumed and punitive damage awards in
defamation actions may unnecessarily chill the speech of many would-be
speakers."
This note proposes that certain guidelines are necessary to clarify the
established content, form, and context standard so the courts and the public
can more reasonably determine what constitutes a matter of public concern
and thus protected speech.8 8 An initial exploration of the various lower
32. "[S]uch individuals will fear the loss of the full range of constitutional liberties
they enjoy in the private sector." Id.
33. See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 774-96
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing generally the potential chilling effect of unre-
strained presumed and punitive damages based on a standard which is not narrowly tailored).
34. See supra note 7.
35. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
36. "Litigation survey data compiled in 1982 indicated that thirty out of forty-seven
recent awards [in libel suits] included awards of 'punitive' damages ... and seven of those
punitive damages awards were for $1 million or more." R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 74
(1986). "More recent survey data indicate that punitive damages awards have now become
even more common and have reached an astronomical average of almost $3 million per
award." Id.
37. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 789 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also SMOLLA,
supra note 36, at 76 ("Why run a controversial story, a story that is a prime candidate for
precipitating a libel suit when a safer, duller story will fill space just as well, without the risks
attendant to the bolder story?").
38. See generally Langvardt, supra note 18, at 259-60.
[A] court's erroneous determination that no public concern existed may lead to disastrous
consequences for a negligent defendant, in terms of presumed and punitive damages. Be-
sides judges' inability to make consistent determinations on the public concern question
absent some ground rules or standards for making such decisions neither the makers of
statements nor such parties' attorneys have any reliable way of predicting the extent of
the legal difficulties and financial burdens they may encounter if their statements turn
out to be false and a jury finds them negligent. The uncertainty would seem likely to lead
to a chilling of first amendment rights.
Id. Comment, The "Public Interest or Concern" Test-Have We Resurrected a Standard that
Should Have Remained in the Defamation Graveyard?, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 647, 648 (1987)
(comparing public concern test to obscenity test). "The Justices seem to suggest that while
they may not be able, to define a 'public concern,' they'll 'know it when [they] see it.'" Id.
(quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurrring) (emphasis in
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/10
1989] "A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN"
courts' analysis, or lack thereof,39 of the content, form, and context stan-
dard, as well as their interpretations of what statements constitute a matter
of public concern 40 illustrates why guidelines are essential. Next, an explo-
ration of the pertinent history of the first amendment acquaints the reader
with the relevant constitutional principles and competing interests behind
the Supreme Court's recent public concern holdings.41 This general histori-
cal analysis links the areas of first amendment rights of public employees
and defamation law by identifying general first amendment principles com-
mon to both areas of the law . 2 The respective histories of public employees'
constitutional rights and defamation law will then be examined, thus pro-
viding the reader with a general understanding of how the content, form,
and context standard evolved. 4  Finally, this note proposes a two-tiered
analysis to the content, form, and context standard. 4 This two-tiered analy-
sis establishes guidelines to alleviate the current standard's inherent vague-
ness.'5 Not only do these guidelines give public employees and would-be
speakers adequate notice as to what topics are appropriate for discussion,
they also offer desirable and helpful guidance for courts in determining
what constitutes a matter of public concern.41
original) (footnote omitted).
39. See infra note 72 and accompanying text for a discussion of those cases in which
the lower courts have summarily disposed of the issue of whether the speech in question was a
matter of public concern without any type of discussion or analysis of the content, form, and
context standard.
40. See infra notes 56-125 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
42. According to one noted author, the first amendment rights of public employees and
defamation defendants are linked by virtue of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). See generally Rubin, When The Governed Criticize Their Governors: Parameters of
Public Employees' Free-Speech Rights, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 106, 107 (1984) (New York
Times "established that criticism of public officials and the government was protected under
the First Amendment. Thus, public employees began to question whether they, too, had the
right to criticize public officials, including their superiors and employers." ).
43. For the relevant history in the area of public employees, see infra notes 143-66 and
accompanying text. For the relevant history in the area of defamation law, see infra notes 200-
37 and accompanying text.
44. See infra section IV.
45. The main criticisms of the content, form, and context standard are that the stan-
dard fails to provide adequate guidance and forces courts to make case-by-case determinations
on whether a particular statement addresses a matter of public concern. For a general over-
view of such criticisms, see ;upra notes 18 & 21-22 and infra notes 47 & 51-52. The purpose
of this note is to address such criticism and propose quidelines to alleviate the current stan-
dard's inherent vagueness. See infra section IV.
46. See infra section IV.
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II. VAGUENESS AND THE NEED FOR CLARITY: PROBLEMS WITH THE
CURRENT CONTENT, FORM, AND CONTEXT STANDARD
The problem with the current content, form, and context standard does
not lie in the Court's reasoning or logic.47 Rather, the problem is the
Court's final resolution-an inherently vague standard.4 8 The content, form,
and context standard is inadequate for three reasons. First, since the estab-
lishment of the standard in 1983,41 confusion as to how the standard should
be applied has arisen in the lower courts.50 Second, the current standard
gives the lower courts too much discretion in deciding fundamental first
amendment issues." Lastly, the current standard does not give potential
47. Many writers have suggested that the distinction between speech on matters of
public concern and purely private speech is an erroneous distinction which severely undermines
the first amendment's protection in regard to public employees' and defamation defendants. In
the context of first amendment rights of government employees, see Milbrath, The Free
Speech Rights of Public Employees: Balancing With the Home Field Advantage, 20 IDAHO L.
REV. 703, 729 (1984) ("The effect of Connick is to skew the balancing of the respective [first
amendment] interests of the employee and employer in favor of the employer."); Note, Nar-
rowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 362 ("The majority in Connick has defined matters of
public concern in significantly more restrictive terms than in previous decisions, thereby nar-
rowing the scope of protected speech for public employees."). Note, New Restrictions, supra
note 21, at 339 ("[A] content prerequisite for first amendment protection of public employee
speech is unwarranted as a matter of both precedent and policy."); Note, Delicate Balance,
supra note 22, at 81 ("The decision in Connick v. Myers, while purporting to endorse some of
the earlier holdings, represents a significant step away from that freedom [freedom of speech]
that most United States citizens take for granted."). But see Casenote, Constitutional
Law-Civil Rights-A Question of Free Speech for Public Employees, 30 WAYNE L. REV.
1309, 1322 (1984) ("[Connick] represents a reasonable curtailment of the speech rights of
public employees."). In the context of defamation law, see Langvardt, supra note 18, at 270
(Defamation law would be better served without the public concern approach taken in Dun &
Bradstreet so long as the standard remains in its present nebulous state.); Comment, supra
note 18, at 1195-96 ("By restricting the protections of the Gertz rule to expressions on matters
of public concern, the plurality has 'cut away the protective mantle of Gertz. "); Note, First
Amendment, supra note 22, at 809-10 ("[T]he willingness of the Court to create additional
doctrinal distinctions at the expense of clarity indicates that the Court is insensitive to the need
to offer clear guidelines and is unwilling to come to rest in the defamation area."); Note, The
Evolution of a Public Issue: New York Times Through Greenmoss, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 773,
790-91 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Evolution] (Contending that Dun & Bradstreet is another
step away from New York Times with the next logical step being the overturning of New York
Times. Such a step "would be a constitutional tragedy."); But see Note, Constitutional Law,
supra note 22, at 543 (the result in Dun & Bradstreet is correct considering the reasoning of
preceding cases).
48. See, e.g., Langvardt, supra note 18, at 259 (commenting in regard to the content,
form, and context standard, "[s]uch a purported test is in reality no test at all").
49. The Supreme Court first formulated the standard in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983). See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 56-125 and accompanying text.
51. Many commentators have expressed the fear that the current content, form, and
context standard will force the courts to make ad hoc determinations on whether a particular
statement is a matter of public concern or purely private speech. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
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litigants any guidance relating to when their speech will be protected and
when their speech will subject them to the consequences associated with
private speech.
52
v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 785 n. 11 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Distrust of
placing in the courts the power to decide what speech was of public concern was precisely the
rationale Gertz offered for rejecting the Rosenbloom plurality approach."); Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (com-
ments that judges should not be in the business of making judgments about which types of
speech are more valuable for first amendment purposes); Bull, Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. v.
Hepps: New Hope for Preserving Freedom of the Press, 38 MERCER L. REV. 785, 788 (1987)
("As a consequence of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the determination
of what is 'of public concern' is to be made by the trial judge, a situation fraught with peril.");
Langvardt, supra note 18, at 253 ("Dun & Bradstreet has embroiled courts in making the very
kinds of content discriminations the approach taken in Gertz seemed designed to eliminate.");
Note, First Amendment, supra note 22, at 805 ("Unfortunately, judges will once again be-
come the final arbiters of what issues are matters of public concern and are thus worthy of
constitutional protection."); Note, Constitutional Law--Supreme Court Restricts First
Amendment Rights of Public Employees-Connick v. Myers, 58 TUL. L. REv. 831, 847
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Supreme Court] ("Connick invites lower courts to apply their own
subjective standards both in assessing the public employer's interest in office harmony and in
determining what subjects are within the public interest."). See generally Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). In Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court held that if a defama-
tory statement concerned "a subject of public or general interest" the plaintiff in a defamation
case must meet the New York Times actual malice test in order to prevail. Rosenbloom, 403
U.S. at 43-44 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued
that the plurality's approach was unworkable and would lead to ad hoc determinations by the
judiciary of whether a particular statement was a subject of public or general interest. Id. at
80-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's argument that the courts are ill-equipped
to determine whether a statement sufficiently involves the public interest was adopted by the
Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
52. Many writers have expressed concern about the current standard due to its lack of
clarity and subjective nature. See Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 338 ("The
Supreme Court has added uncertainty to complexity by its decision in the case of Connick v.
Myers."); Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 528-29 ("[Dun & Bradstreet] brings
increased difficulty in predicting what libels will be subject to presumed and punitive damages
without the proof of 'actual malice' as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan."); Id. at 529
n.10 ("Much of the difficulty in prediction comes with the subjective nature of deciding what
is a public concern and what is a private concern."); Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at
339-40 ("The inconsistent decisions that will inevitably result from such a subjective inquiry
will fail to provide adequate notice to employees as to what topics are appropriate for discus-
sion within a governmental agency."); Note, First Amendment, supra note 22, at 809 ("Per-
haps the most unsettling element of the Dun & Bradstreet decision, however, is the lack of
clear guidelines regarding the level of constitutional protection that will be accorded future
defendants in defamation actions."); Note, Supreme Court, supra note 51, at 848 (the stan-
dard set forth by the Connick Court is likely to generate even greater uncertainty with respect
to the scope of public employees' first amendment rights); Note, Delicate Balance, supra note
22, at 100 ("The amorphous standard set out in Connick is sure to result in the public em-
ployee's (and employer's) total inability to predict where the boundaries of acceptable conduct
are, resulting in even more cases appearing in the already crowded court system.").
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The law in the lower courts since Connick v. Myers 3 and Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,"' is a direct product of the vague
standard enunciated in these two cases.55 The cases that have been decided
since these two landmark decisions can be divided into three categories. The
first and largest category of decisions involves those cases in which courts,
without legal analysis, determine whether the speech at issue is a matter of
public concern. 56 In the second category of decisions, the courts primarily
focus on one of the three elements of the standard--content, form, or con-
text-to the exclusion of the other two elements in arriving at a decision. 57
Finally, the third category of decisions sets forth those cases in which courts
place the same type of speech in different categories.5 8
A. Cursory Application of the Content, Form, and Context Standard
The lower courts have experienced considerable difficulty applying the
content, form, and context standard. The most common problem the courts
have encountered is justifying the conclusions they reach regarding whether
the speech in question is a matter of public concern. In employing the con-
tent, form, and context standard, many courts supply little or no legal anal-
ysis to support their holdings on the issue;59 instead, they simply state that
the speech in question is or is not a matter of public concern.60
Lower courts deciding the public concern issue typically recount the
facts, cite to either Connick6' or Dun & Bradstreet,6 2 and then decide
53. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
54. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
55. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 38, at
662-64 (comparing the content, form, and context standard ennunciated in Dun & Bradstreet
with the "public interest or concern" standard); Note, Public Teacher's Right to Free Speech:
"A Matter of Public Concern", 12 S.U.L. REv. 217, 227 (1986) ("The law since Connick v.
Myers is a direct product of the tedious and nearly unmanageable test left in place by Con-
nick."). For a general discussion of how the content, form, and context standard and the public
interest or concern standard are similar, see infra notes 238-43 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 97-125 and accompanying text.
59. See generally Langvardt, supra note 18, at 261-66 (discussing what the cases that
have been decided since Dun & Bradstreet reveal about public concerns and the tendency of
many lower courts to make public concern-private concern determinations "in a summary
fashion, with little or no analysis"); Comment, supra note 38, at 662-69 (discussing problems
state courts have had in applying a public concern-type analysis and "the virtual absence of
analysis within the cases that pass on the issue") (emphasis in original); Note, supra note 55,
at 228-33 (discussing public employee cases that have been decided since Connick and estab-
lishing a trend among lower courts to characterize speech as adressing a matter of public
concern without any real attempt at applying the content, form, and context standard).
60. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
61. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). If the case involves a public employee's
freedom of speech rights, the lower court will cite to Connick as the basis for its decision.
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whether a public concern exists. Twist v. Meese's is an excellent example of
this type of case. In Twist, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice dismissed an attorney for reporting a suspected criminal conspiracy
to obstruct an investigation.6 ' After giving a brief account of the facts, 5 the
Twist court made reference to the Connick standard.68 Then, the court cav-
alierly stated "[h]ere the involved speech implicated a matter of public con-
cern."67 Thus, without offering any support or legal analysis, the court de-
cided the public concern issue in one simple sentence.
To further illustrate the tendency of lower courts to casually classify a
particular statement either as a matter of public concern or purely private
speech, a second example is helpful. In Chabal v. Reagan6 5 a United States
Marshal was dismissed for communicating his belief that he was bound to
follow the instructions and orders of the federal judges.0 9 Following a con-
densed statement of the facts and a cursory reference to Connick,7 0 the
court simply stated that Chabal's speech was not a matter of public con-
cern.7 1 Again, the court failed to explain why or how such a conclusion had
been made.
A reading of these two cases, and the numerous other cases7 2 similarly
62. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Likewise, if
the case is a defamation case brought by a private individual, the lower court will cite to Dun
& Bradstreet as the basis for its decision.
63. 661 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C. 1987).
64. Id. at 232.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 233.
67. Id.
68. 633 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
69. Id. at 1063.
70. Id. at 1066.
71. Id. The court characterized Chabal's speech as "matters only of personal interest
regarding internal operations of the Marshal's Service and what he perceived should be its
proper relationship vis-a-vis the federal judiciary." Id. This is the only legal analysis/explana-
tion the court gave to support its determination that Chabal's speech did not address a matter
of public concern.
72. See, e.g., Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 23 (4th Cir. 1987) (speech related to
political activity protected; however, court did not specifically hold speech addressed a matter
of public concern--court assumed speech was protected and proceeded directly to balancing
test); Daniels v. Quinn, 801 F.2d 687, 690 (4th Cir. 1986) (court held teacher's complaint that
remedial reading materials did not arrive in timely fashion did not address matter of public
concern after brief statement of controlling cases); Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 798 F.2d
748, 758 (5th Cir. 1986) ("This remark, which concerns the academic development of public
high school football players and their potential eligibility for playing college football, certainly
addresses matters of concern to the community." This statement constitutes the extent of the
court's legal analysis on the public concern issue.); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th
Cir. 1985) (police officer's entertainment performances in blackface held to be protected form
of artistic expression because of community interest); Alinovi v. Worcester School Comm., 777
F.2d 776, 787 (1st Cir. 1985) (court classified teacher's speech as private speech because it
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decided, seems to indicate that many judges classify speech based on the
principle, "I know it when I see it."'7 3 Such an approach creates several
problems. First, judges may not always know the difference between speech
regarding matters of public concern and purely private speech.7 4 Second,
judges will have different interpretations of the public concern issue.75
Third, such an ad-hoc approach leads to inconsistent results.7e Fourth, such
an approach does not provide interested parties adequate notice concerning
was aimed at solving a disciplinary problem; court did not justify its holding with any type of
legal analysis); Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (FBI agent disciplined
for making comments concerning methods being used for determining layoffs; without any
legal analysis, the court simply determined that Murray's speech was "an example of the quin-
tessential employee beef: management has acted incompetently."); Brown v. Department of
Transp., F.A.A., 735 F.2d 543, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (air traffic controller supervisor's speech
concerning air traffic controllers' strike held to be private speech; court did not provide any
legal analysis); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984) (court simply classified
police officer's speech encouraging fellow officer to appeal suspension as private speech con-
cerning personnel dispute); Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 645
(8th Cir. 1983) (court based determination that speech addressed matter of public concern on
Pickering balancing test rather than applying content, form, and context standard); Post v.
Regan, 677 F. Supp. 203, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (because of "widespread publicity given by the
media to the reported losses and subsequent personnel actions," speech addressed a matter of
public concern); DiFranco v. City of Chicago, 642 F. Supp. 243, 247 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (court
held that city employee's speech concerning misuse of city resources clearly addresses a matter
of public concern); Rodriguez v. Chandler, 641 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("[M]inority employment and minority rights issues are no doubt matters of public concern.");
Wagner v. Hawkins, 634 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D. Ark. 1986) ("It would be difficult to imag-
ine a matter of greater public concern than the qualifications of candidates for political office
.... .); Lehpamer v. Troyer, 601 F. Supp. 1466, 1468-69 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (Police officer's
speech concerning poor evaluations and work assignments "would not enrich the public's store
of appropriate knowledge regarding the operation of the police department as it affects the
public;" therefore, speech was unprotected.); Hirsch v. Cooper, 737 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (After briefly citing to Dun & Bradstreet, court held Cooper's statement that he
would not send his dog or cat to Hirsch for medical treatment was actionable per se because it
was purely private speech.); Rabren v. Straigis, 498 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (Because harbor pilots were commonly a subject of media coverage, statements accusing
pilots of incompetence, drunkenness, and involvement in waterfront corruption and racketeer-
ing addressed a matter of public concern.); Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So. 2d
72, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("We have no trouble determining that the instant case
involves alleged defamation arising out of a matter of public interest or concern."); Great
Costal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 849, 851-52 (Va. 1985) (court determined
employer's statement that an employee had attempted to bribe a shop foreman addressed a
private concern; court did not engage in any particular discussion of the issue). No judgment
or conclusion as to the correctness of the courts' decisions is offered. These cases simply serve
as examples of the numerous lower court cases in which the public concern issue is made
without any type of legal analysis.
73. Comment, supra note 38, at 648; Langvardt, supra note 18, at 259.
74. Langvardt, supra note 18, at 259.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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what topics are appropriate for discussion." Finally, when lower court
judges make such ad-hoc determinations, without justification or support,
the very purpose of the first amendment is undermined. 8
B. Dispositions Based Primarily on One Element of the Content, Form,
and Context Standard
Because of the fact specific nature of the Connick and Dun & Brad-
street decisions, many courts have had problems applying the content, form,
and context standard.79 Despite the Supreme Court's mandate that the pub-
lic concern issue "must be determined by the content, form, and context of
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record," 80 many courts have
misapplied the standard by relying primarily on one specific element of the
standard instead of using all three of the elements. Generally, in the area of
public employees' freedom of speech rights, courts have tended to overem-
phasize the "context" factor of the standard.81 Similarly, in defamation
77. Id. at 260.
78. See infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
79. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) were very factually-oriented decisions. In Connick, the Court
evaluated each question on Myers' questionnaire, the circumstances behind the distribution of
the questionnaire, and the effect of the questionnaire. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49. Because
the Court believed that Myers' questionnaire would not convey any useful information to the
public, the Court held that the questions were not of public importance. Id. at 148. Also,
because the questionnaire was prepared as a result of an employment dispute, the context
factor of the public concern test played a major role in the Court's determination. Id. at 153.
Similarily, in Dun & Bradstreet, the Court examined the surrounding circumstances of the
credit report. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. Based on the Court's analysis of the specific
facts in Dun & Bradstreet, the fact that the credit report was only disseminated to five sub-
scribers played a major role in the Court's decision. Id. Consequently, the Court over-
emhasized the form factor of the content, form, and context standard. Id.
80. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
81. See, e.g., Davis v. West Community Hosp., 755 F.2d 455, 459, 461-62 (5th Cir.
1985) (letter written by general surgeon to hospital supervisors concerning dispute with other
hospital personnel and alleging ineffective patient treatment held to be purely private speech
based on context of speech; context of speech consisted of personal grievances); Boyd v. Secre-
tary of the Navy, 709 F.2d 684, 685, 687 (11th Cir. 1983) (comments of naval machinist
supervisor regarding propriety of planned training program did not address a matter of public
concern because speech arose in context of employee grievance); Lynn v. Smith, 628 F. Supp.
283, 285-86, 289 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (public employee who was chief shop stewart for his union
was punished for filing grievances; because grievances arose in context of employer-employee
dispute, speech was not protected). Compare Hamer v. Brown, 641 F. Supp. 662, 664, 666
(W.D. Ark. 1986) (college professor's speech to committee investigating expenditure of public
funds was not protected since speech concerned personnel actions taken by college administra-
tion) with Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398, 1400, 1402 (8th Cir. 1987) (college professor's
speech relating to expenditure of public funds did address a matter of public concern because
speech was made in context of committee investigation into usage of such funds). These cases
are provided as examples of how many lower courts use the context factor to make their final
decisions. No opinion is given regarding whether the final decisions were correct.
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cases, courts usually rely on the "form" factor to determine whether the
speech addresses a matter of public concern.82 Although such reliance is
understandable, based on the specific facts of Connick s and Dun & Brad-
street84 as discussed later in this note, such reliance results in a mechanical
application of the standard. To illustrate this point, a recently decided Sev-
enth Circuit opinion is examined.
In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided a public
employment case." The dispute in this case centered around a public em-
ployee's comment concerning the alleged discharge of the director of the
state agency where she was employed." The employee's comment was re-
sponsive to an article in the Chicago Sun Times entitled, "Report Thomp-
son Axes Aide."'8 7 In addressing the issue of whether the first amendment
protected the employee's speech, the court of appeals held that the em-
82. See, e.g., In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 637-38,
644-45 (8th Cir. 1986) (letter to congressional committee investigating Cattle-Pak discount
program addressed a matter of public concern since investigation was a newsworthy event);
Mutafis v. Erie Ins. Exch., 775 F.2d 593, 594-95 (4th Cir. 1985) (defamatory statement in the
form of an inter-office memorandum did not address a matter of public concern); Pearce v.
E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1493-94, 1504 (D.D.C. 1987) (report naming
employee as one of several individuals responsible for fraudulent securities practices was a
matter of public concern because the entire incident received enormous publicity); Dexter's
Hearthside Restaurant, Inc. v. Whitehall Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 218, 220-21, 508
N.E.2d 113, 114, 116-17 (1987) (erroneous report stating that Dexter's account was delin-
quent did not address a matter of public concern since publication of report was limited; form
of report more important than state law which required reporting of delinquent accounts).
These cases simply serve as examples as to how many lower courts have relied solely on the
form element of the content, form, and context standard. No opinion is given concerning the
propriety of the courts' final decisions.
83. See supra note 79.
84. See supra note 79.
85. Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1980).
86. Id. at 36-37. In Yoggerst, Yoggerst worked as an administrative assistant, in
charge of property, for the Illinois Governor's Office of Manpower and Human Development
(GOMAHD). Id. at 36. On April 26, 27, and 28, 1978, unconfirmed reports were circulating
that the Director of GOMAHD, L. W. Murray, had been discharged by the Governor. Id. In
fact, on April 27, 1978, the Chicago Sun Times featured an article entitled, "Report Thomp-
son Axes Aide." Id. On the morning of April 27, Yoggerst called a fellow employee, Linda
Coker, seeking information about a work-related matter. Id. at 37. Yoggerst opened the phone
conversation by inquiring "Did you hear the good news?" Id. Yoggerst's comment was obvi-
ously directed to the rumors of Murray's dismissal. Id.
Coker reported the incident to one of the supervisors. Id. Consequently, Yoggerst was
reprimanded and a memorandum was placed in her personnel file. Id. Yoggerst then filed a
grievance requesting that the memorandum be removed from her file. Id. Yoggerst's request
was subsequently denied. Id.
Later, Yoggerst resigned her position at GOMAHD and filed suit alleging that the memo-
randum and denial of her grievance violated her first amendment rights. Id. The district court
held against Yoggerst without addressing Yoggerst's first amendment claim. Id. at 38.
87. Id. at 36.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 [1989], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol23/iss3/10
"A MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN"
ployee's "comment did involve a matter of some public importance and con-
cern."88 However, the case did not stop here. Since the district court had
previously dismissed the employee's case on a motion for summary judg-
ment, the court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings. 89
Following the Seventh Circuit's remand, the Supreme Court decided
Connick v. Myers."' Based on Connick, the court of appeals reversed its
earlier holding and found that the speech at issue did not address a matter
of public concern.91 Although the court stated that "the content factor is
most important" in deciding whether the speech addressed a matter of pub-
lic concern, 92 the court's conclusion seems to indicate otherwise. Despite the
court's claim that the "context in which [the employee] spoke does not alter
our conclusion as to the proper characterization of her remark,"9 3 the con-
text of the remark was, arguably, the determinative factor. According to
the court, the employee's remark merely reflected her personal feelings to-
ward the director.9' In other words, the context in which the employee
spoke was personal rather than public. Thus, based on the context of the
employee's speech, the court determined that the first amendment did not
protect her remark.95 Because the Supreme Court specifically devised a
three-prong test to determine the public concern issue, the Seventh Circuit
arguably misapplied the test by only focusing on the context of the em-
88. Id. at 40. In addressing the first amendment issue, the court stated:
Yoggerst's comment did not necessarily involve a matter where "free and open debate is
vital to informed decision-making by the electorate." But her casual comment did involve
a matter of some public importance and concern (as evidenced by continuing media spec-
ulation concerning the Director's tenure), and, we believe, First Amendment protection
should be available absent countervailing negative impacts on the employment
relationship.
Id. Because Connick had not yet been decided, the court relied on Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968). According to Pickering, courts are required to balance the employee's
interest "in commenting upon matters of public concern" against the employer's interest "in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering,
391 U.S. at 568. For a more thorough discussion of Pickering, see infra notes 148-63 and
accompanying text.
In Yoggerst, no evidence was presented that Yoggerst's comments affected her employ-
ment relationship or impeded her ability to efficiently perform her employment duties. Yog-
gerst, 623 F.2d at 40.
89. Id. at 41.
90. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
91. Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1984). The court explained that in
Yoggerst I, "we concluded that Yoggerst's statement involved a matter of public concern with-
out the benefit of the Supreme Court's test in Connick for determining the issue." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Although the court classified Yoggerst's speech as private speech, the court
acknowledged "that the rumors that Murray would be fired-a matter of obvious public inter-
est and concern-were the impetus for Yoggerst's remarks to Coker." Id.
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ployee's speech. 96
C. Conflicting Application of the Content, Form, and Context Standard
1. Public Employee Cases
The unequal application of the content, form, and context standard is
the final and most disturbing problem that has arisen in the lower courts.
Because the Supreme Court failed to provide adequate guidelines for the
lower courts to work with, many courts have placed the same type of speech
in different categories. 7 In the area of public employees' first amendment
rights, the context factor has proven to be the most problematic. Two cases,
Johnson v. Lincoln University of Commonwealth System of Higher Educa-
tion98 and Ferrara v. Mills,9 best illustrate this problem.
The Johnson case involved the dismissal of a tenured faculty member
as a direct result of statements he made concerning the University's
faculty-student ratio.'0 0 In Ferrara, a public school teacher was demoted in
retaliation for comments he made concerning the assignment of a teacher to
a field of study in which the teacher lacked certification.' 0' In both cases,
the statements were an outgrowth of a personal dispute between the teacher
and the school administration. 0 2 Further, the dispute in both cases con-
cerned questions of academic policy and educational standards."0 Despite
96. Because the standard requires courts to look to all the circumstances surrounding
the speech "as revealed by the whole record," it is arguable that the Court intended each
element of the public concern test to have equal weight. See generally Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983) (setting out exact language of the public concern test); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (same).
97. Compare Czurlanis v. Albanese, 721 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1983) (government mis-
management and waste deemed a matter of public concern) and Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670
(1 th Cir. 1984) (corruption in Sheriff's office not a matter of public concern). Compare also
Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist., 785 F.2d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 1986) (A teacher's aide's
discussion with mothers of two students in her special education class concerning allocation of
aide time did not address a matter of public concern.) with Southside Pub. Schools v. Hill, 827
F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1987) (Teachers' complaints to department of education concerning delay
in implementation of programs for handicapped students addressed a matter of public con-
cern.); Twist v. Meese, 661 F. Supp. 231, 233 (D.D.C. 1987) (A Department of Justice attor-
ney's speech concerning his suspected belief of criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice ad-
dressed a matter of public concern.) with Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, Va., 745 F.2d 868 (4th
Cir. 1984) (Police department employee's whistle-blowing activities concerning understafling
and inefficiency of police department's emergency operations center did not address a matter
of public concern.).
98. 776 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1985).
99. 781 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1986).
100. Johnson, 776 F.2d at 447-48.
101. Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1510-11.
102. Johnson, 776 F.2d at 447; Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1515.
103. Johnson v. Lincoln Univ. of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 776 F.2d 443,
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these similarities, the courts reached different conclusions. In Johnson, the
Third Circuit held that Johnson's dismissal violated the first amendment
since his speech addressed a matter of public concern,104 whereas in Fer-
rara the Eleventh Circuit held that the first amendment did not protect
Ferrara's statements. 0 5
This disparity is a direct consequence of the lack of guidance the cur-
rent content, form, and context standard provides the lower courts. In this
instance, the two courts interpreted the context element of the Connick test
differently. The Johnson court specifically held that the mere fact that
Johnson's statements were an outgrowth of a personal dispute"' did not
prevent his statements from touching upon a matter of public concern,107
whereas the Ferrara court held that because of the context 08 of his speech,
Ferrara's statements did not address a matter of public concern. 109
Ironically, the Ferrara court acknowledged that the educational issue
addressed by Ferrara is one of the most frequently debated issues in the
public forum." 0 Despite this recognition that the content of Ferrara's
speech addressed a matter of public concern,"' the court seems to have
disregarded the content factor of the content, form, and context standard.
The only explanation for the Eleventh Circuit's confusion is that the court
misapplied the Connick standard, possibly believing that any speech arising
in the context of a personal dispute was unprotected. The Ferrara court's
confusion in applying the Connick standard lends support to the argument
that certain guidelines are necessary to clarify the content, form, and con-
text standard so that courts can more reasonably determine what consti-
452 (3d Cir. 1985); Ferrara, 781 F.2d at 1515.
104. Johnson, 776 F.2d at 451.
105. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515 (l1th Cir. 1986).
106. In 1977, a wide scale dispute broke out at Lincoln University over a proposed dras-
tic reduction in the number of faculty that would have increased the student-faculty ratio.
Before the dispute was over, many dissenting faculty members were dismissed for voicing their
opinions. Johnson was one of the faculty members who was dismissed. Johnson, 776 F.2d at
448-49.
107. Id. at 451.
108. Ferrara's statements were made in a meeting with the principal in which Ferrara
and the principal were discussing Ferrara's course assignments for the following term. Ferrara,
781 F.2d at 1510-11. Also the out-of-field teacher was assigned to teach a class Ferrara
wanted to teach. Id.
109. Id. at 1515.
110. Id. Although the Ferrara court used the term "public forum," the court was not
using it as a legal term of art. Rather, the court was simply acknowledging the fact that
speech concerning educational issues generally addresses a matter of public concern. Id. Regu-
lations affecting speech are oftentimes scrutinized on the basis of where the speech occurs. See
generally Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (describing
types of fora and level of first amendment protection speech is given based on forum where
speech occurs).
111. Ferrara v. Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986).
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tutes a matter of public concern.
2. Defamation Cases
This same controversy is reflected in libel cases brought since Dun &
Bradstreet."' Generally, in defamation cases, the form factor of the stan-
dard seems to give courts the most difficulty."13 Two cases, Jacobson v.
Rochester Communications"4 and Miles v. Perry,"5 are demonstrative of
the confusion in this area.
The Jacobson case involved a false report by a radio station that
Jacobson was serving a sentence in the Stillwater State Prison for arson." 6
In Miles, several members of the Union Baptist Church's Board of Trustees
falsely accused Miles of misappropriating church funds."' In both cases,
the statements were found to be false and defamatory" 8 and the plaintiffs
were found to be private individuals."19 Further, both of the defamatory
statements at issue imputed criminal conduct. 20 Despite these similarities,
112. This is not surprising since the Dun & Bradstreet standard is identical to the Con-
nick standard. See supra notes 11 & 15 and accompanying text.
113. Compare Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083 (1986) (Allegations
concerning improper loans made by a bank deemed a matter of public concern because banks
are subject to federal and state licensing regulations.) with Connolly v. Labowitz, 519 A.2d
138, 141 (Del. Super. 1986) (Dissemination of information concerning qualification and per-
formance of physician deemed not a matter of public concern despite state licensing require-
ments.). Compare also Straw v. Chase Revel, Inc., 813 F.2d 356, 362 (11th Cir. 1987) (in-
vestment advice deemed a matter of public concern) with Sunward Corp. v. Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1987) (credit report not a matter of public concern).
114. 410 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1987).
115. 529 A.2d 199 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
116. Jacobson, 410 N.W.2d at 832. Although Jacobson had been convicted of arson, he
did not serve time in prison. Also, following a change of venue, Jacobson was retried and found
not guilty of the criminal charges against him. Id.
117. Miles, 529 A.2d at 202. Miles had been a member of the church for thirty years
and she had served on the church's finance committee as the financial secretary for six years.
Id. In 1981, the board of trustees employed an accountant to review the church's tax exempt
status. Id. As a result of the review, the board of trustees conducted an investigation of the
church's financial affairs. Id. In January of 1983, a meeting of the church membership was
called to inform the members of the investigatory findings. Id. At the meeting, several mem-
bers of the board implied that Miles had misappropriated church funds. Id. At trial, Miles
proved that the statements were made of and concerning her, that the statements were false
and defamatory, that the defendants were responsible for making the statements, and that she
suffered humiliation and anguish as a result of these statements. Id.
118. Jacobson v. Rochester Communications, 410 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. 1987);
Miles, 529 A.2d at 202.
119. Jacobson, 410 N.W.2d at 836; Miles v. Perry, 529 A.2d 199, 204 (Conn. App. Ct.
1987). This finding is important because it triggers the Dun & Bradstreet analysis. See infra
notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
120. Jacobson, 410 N.W.2d at 832; Miles, 529 A.2d at 202. At common law, state-
ments imputing criminal conduct were per se actionable. See infra note 205 and accompanying
text.
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the final outcome of the two cases differed. In Jacobson, the court held that
the news report addressed a legitimate matter of public concern,12 whereas
the Miles court held that the defamatory statements did not address a mat-
ter of public concern. 122
In this instance, the two courts interpreted the form element of the
Dun & Bradstreet test differently. Although the statements were publicly
disclosed in both cases, the Miles court seemed to emphasize the fact that
Miles' speech did not involve a matter of public concern because the state-
ment was only made to members of Miles' church, rather than to the public
at large.'22 Arguably, the Miles court placed too much emphasis on the
form of the dissemination.
The Dun & Bradstreet Court stated that the content, form, and con-
text of the speech must be reviewed in light of the entire record.2 By fo-
cusing mainly on the form factor, the Miles court misapplied the Dun &
Bradstreet test. However, since the Supreme Court did not provide any
guidelines as to the application of the content, form, and context stan-
dard," 5 the Miles court cannot be faulted for misapplying the standard.
Instead, the fault lies in the standard itself. Because the standard is too
vague, lower courts cannot determine what constitutes a matter of public
concern. Thus, guidelines must be established so that courts can more rea-
sonably resolve critical public concern questions.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONTENT, FORM, AND CONTEXT
STANDARD: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Freedom of Speech and Its Historical Significance
According to some authorities, the numerical position of the first
amendment is symbolic because freedom of expression enjoys primacy in
our scale of rights.' 28 Freedom of speech is the matrix of every other form
of freedom; it is an indispensable condition which has been recognized his-
torically, politically, and legally.' 27 In 1964, the Supreme Court declared
that cases involving the first amendment must be considered "against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."' 28 Although
121. Jacobson, 410 N.W.2d at 832.
122. Miles, 529 A.2d at 207.
123. Id.
124. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
125. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
126. A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 (1981).
127. Note, supra note 55, at 217 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937)).
128. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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the political foundations of the first amendment are often emphasized, espe-
cially by the Supreme Court, 29 the first amendment's protection of free
speech goes much deeper than just political speech. 30 The framers of the
Constitution believed that a free press should advance truth, science, moral-
ity, and the arts in general, as well as responsible government. 31
Despite its primacy, the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech is not absolute.132 Further, according to the Supreme Court, not all
speech is deserving of equal first amendment protection.' 3 In the hierarchy
129. A. Cox, supra note 126, at 3. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-gov-
ernment." Id. at 74-75.
130. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Supreme Court
stated:
The constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and intended to remove govern-
mental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that the use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in
the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity
and choice upon which our political system rests.
Id. at 24.
131. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 42 (1971) (quoting Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967)).
132. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) "The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and
causing a panic." Id. at 52.
133. The Supreme Court on occasion has recognized that not all speech is deserving of
equal first amendment protection. Obscene speech and "fighting words" have been granted no
protection. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (The first amendment
was not intended to protect every utterance; obscenity is outside the protection of the first
amendment.); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (explaining that
freedom of speech is not absolute and that certain types of speech, such as lewd, obscene,
profane, libelous, and insulting or "fighting" words, have such slight social value that they may
be regulated); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591-92 (1952) (advocating violent
overthrow of the government is unprotected speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931) (publication of troop sailing time may be enjoined). Some areas of speech are pro-
tected, but do not warrant as much first amendment protection. Commercial speech, speech
concerning purely commercial transactions, is a good example of such speech. See, e.g.,
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[W]e instead have afforded
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values."); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (Common sense differences be-
tween commercial speech and other varieties of speech "suggest that a different degree of
protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial informa-
tion is unimpaired."); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 563-64 (1980) (Because the "First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising," the government may ban deceitful communica-
tions and commercial speech related to illegal activity. However, if speech is not misleading or
does not relate to unlawful activity, the state may only regulate such commercial speech if it
has a substantial interest and the regulation is narrowly drawn to achieve the state's interest.).
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of first amendment values, speech dealing with matters of public concern
occupies the highest rung. 4 Thus, in deciding first amendment cases,
courts must first consider them against our profound national commitment
to uninhibited and robust debate. 35 Second, courts must balance the com-
peting interests at stake to devise a workable solution to the problems inher-
ent in all first amendment cases.' 36
As a result of this balancing of competing interests, judicial interpreta-
tion of the first amendment is continually changing. In the 1960s, two ma-
jor changes occurred. In 1964, the area of defamation law was constitution-
alized in order to give the first amendment breathing space. 3 7 Then in
1967, the Supreme Court incorporated the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions138 into the general body of constitutional law thus extending free-
dom of speech to public employees. 39 Since 1964, in the area of defamation
law, the Supreme Court has struggled to devise a workable standard which
properly balances the competing interests of the first amendment against
the individual's reputation interests. 40 Likewise, in the area of first amend-
ment rights of public employees, since 1967, the Court has gone through a
similar struggle balancing the employee's first amendment interests against
the employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service that
the office performs through its employees.' 4' Today, in both areas of the
law, litigants' first amendment rights are given greater protection when
their speech addresses a matter of public concern. 41
B. Public Employees: From McAuliffe to Connick
Since 1892, public employment was considered a privilege, 143 and pub-
lic employees had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of
their employment.14 In 1952, the right-privilege distinction reached its
134. NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982).
135. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
136. A. Cox, supra note 126, at 4.
137. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "[E]rroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive.'" Id. at 271-72.
138. See generally Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions simply states that public employment cannot be conditioned on the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. Id. at 605-06.
139. Id.
140. See infra notes 212-37 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 143-87 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 5 & 7 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at 340 (Until the mid-twentieth
century, courts viewed public employment as a privilege that the government could bestow on
its own terms.).
144. See generally McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517
(1892). Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Keyishian, public employees' constitutional
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high point when the Supreme Court held that while people may assemble,
speak, and believe as they choose, they have no right to work for the state
on their own terms.14 5 However, in 1967, the Supreme Court finally put the
right-privilege distinction to rest and vastly expanded the constitutional
rights afforded government employees. 146 Although the Court expressly re-
jected the right-privilege distinction in 1967 and broke new ground in the
area of first amendment rights of public employees, it did not set forth a
discernible standard.147 Accordingly, the Supreme Court attempted to fill
this void in Pickering v. Board of Education.148
rights were controlled by McAuliffe. In McAuliffe, Justice Holmes observed that "[a police-
man] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
145. Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 340 n.15 (citing Adler v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952)). "At issue in Adler was the constitutionality of New York's
Feinberg Law, which effectively precluded from state employment any person advocating, or
belonging to organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the government."
Adler, 342 U.S. at 487-90. The petitioner, a public school teacher, contested the constitution-
ality of the law on the grounds that it infringed upon his freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly rights, as well as the free speech and assembly rights of all other public employees
and those seeking such' employment. Id. at 491-92. In upholding the law, the Court empha-
sized that the only limitation placed on an individual was with respect to his freedom to choose
between membership in a subversive organization and public employment. Id. at 493.
146. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). Keyishian was an
English instructor at the State University of New York. Id. at 591. As a faculty member of an
institution of higher education owned and operated by the State of New York, Keyishian's
employment was conditioned on compliance with a New York plan formulated to prevent the
appointment or retention of subversive persons in state employment. Id. at 591-92. As part of
the plan, all faculty members were required to sign a certificate stating that they were not
Communists, and if they ever had been Communists, that they had reported that fact to the
President of the University. Id. at 592. When Keyishian refused to sign the certificate, his
contract was not renewed. Id. In upholding the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court
expressly overruled Adler and held that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
correctly stated the law when it held that "the theory that public employment which may be
denied altogether may be subject to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been
uniformly rejected." Id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239
(2d Cir. 1966)). See also Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at 341 n.18 and accompany-
ing text (Keyishian vastly expanded the rights of government workers by laying the right-
privilege distinction to rest; note 18 discusses the variety of rights extended to government
employees as a result of Keyishian.).
147. Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 341.
148. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering, a school teacher at a public high school, wrote a
letter to the editor of the local newspaper criticizing the way in which the board of education
and the superintendent of the school had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the
school. Id. at 564. After the letter was published, Pickering was fired. Id. The board of educa-
tion justified Pickering's firing on the grounds that the letter's publication was detrimental to
the efficient operation and administration of the schools. Id. Although Pickering's letter con-
tained some factual errors, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal violated Pickering's
constitutional right of free speech. Id. at 574. In so holding, the Court stated, "absent proof of
false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's exercise of his right to speak
on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employ-
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Most writers consider Pickering a landmark decision in the area of
first amendment rights of public employees for two reasons.'49 First, the
Pickering Court reiterated its rejection of the notion that public employees
must relinquish their first amendment rights as a condition precedent to
public employment. 50 Second, the Pickering Court laid the ground work
for future retaliatory discharge cases.'51 Although the Supreme Court ex-
pressly recognized the public employee's right to enjoy constitutional privi-
leges, the Court did not grant blanket protection to all employee speech.' 52
Instead, the Pickering Court recognized that the public employer also had a
strong interest in promoting and maintaining the efficiency of the public
service that the office performs through its public employees.' 53 In order to
reconcile these competing interests, the Pickering Court adopted a balanc-
ing test in which the employee's interests as a citizen were weighed against
the employer's need to maintain professional relationships and the proper
working atmosphere.15 4
While the Pickering Court refused to enunciate any specific guidelines
to judge all such employee speech, 55 the Court did list a number of ele-
ments to be considered in balancing the competing interests. 15 These fac-
ment." Id.
149. See, e.g., Note, Supreme Court, supra note 51, at 833. (Pickering was a landmark
decision because the "Supreme Court held that an employee's right to speak on issues of pub-
lic importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.") (quoting
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. at 574). But see Note, supra note 55, at 220 (Pickering
was the first indication of the erosion of the first amendment rights of public employees.).
150. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75. See also Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at
342 (Pickering is the leading case on the free speech rights of public employees because it
reiterated the Supreme Court's rejection of the idea that public employees had to relinquish
their first amendment rights as a condition of their employment.).
151. See infra notes 172 & 180-85 and accompanying text.
152. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. See also Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at 342
(no blanket protection).
153. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also Note, supra note
55, at 220 (quoting balancing of interests language from the Pickering decision); Note, Nar-
rowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 342 (discussing strength of state's interest in providing
quality public services); Casenote, supra note 47, at 1316 (second part of the test, once speech
has been determined to be a matter of public concern, is to balance the employee's interest
against the government's interest in maintaining office efficiency).
154. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. See also Milbrath, supra note 47, at 707 (The problem
in every public employee case in which the employee claims he was fired in retaliation for
exercising his first amendment rights is to arrive at the proper balance between the employee's
rights and the government's rights.); Note, Delicate Balance, supra note 22, at 86 (same).
155. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
156. These elements include: I) whether the statements are directed towards any person
with whom the employee would normally be in contact in .the course of his daily work; 2)
whether the employee's immediate supervisor must maintain employee discipline or harmony
among co-workers; 3) the extent to which the employee's personal loyalty to and confidence i.n
his superiors are necessary to the proper functioning of the relationship between them; 4) the
extent to which the statements, if false, would be difficult to counter because of the employee's
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tors mainly focus upon the effect that the employee's speech has on the
efficient operation of the workplace.157 In Pickering, the balance was struck
in favor of Pickering's right to comment on matters of public concern, since
there was no evidence presented that his letter in any way harmed the effi-
cient operation of the school system.'58
The content of Pickering's letter proved to be a critical factor in the
Pickering decision since the content addressed a matter of legitimate public
concern. 159 Another critical factor was the context of Pickering's speech.160
Since Pickering's letter was published in a public forum, the context of the
letter strengthened Pickering's right to speak.'' Despite the importance of
presumed greater access to the real facts; 5) whether the object of the statement could easily
rebut the statements if they are erroneous; 6) whether the statements impede the employee's
proper performance of his daily duties; 7) whether the statements interfere with the regular
operation of the involved institution; 8) whether the nature of the employee's job calls for
confidentiality; and 9) whether the matters commented upon are of legitimate public concern.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-73.
157. Note, Supreme Court, supra note 51, at 833-34. See also Note, Narrowing the
Scope, supra note 21, at 342-43 ("These elements focus in large part upon the employee's
relationship with his co-workers, employer, and the hiring institution."); Note, New Restric-
tions, supra note 21, at 342-43 (The factors include the state's interest in maintaining disci-
pline by immediate supervisors and harmony among co-workers, in preserving loyalty and con-
fidence in the particular employment relationship, and in discharging incompetent employees.);
Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Dismissal of State Employee for Distributing
Questionnaire Upheld Where Speech Tangentially Affected Public Concern and Questionnaire
had Potential to Disrupt Office, Undermine Supervisory Authority, and Destroy Close Work-
ing Relationships: Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983), 13 BALTIMORE L. REV. 365, 367
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Dismissal] (introducing factors used to determine the strength of
the competing interests).
158. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 567-73 (1968). The Court could find no
evidence that Pickering's letter affected his ability to efficiently perform his teaching duties. Id.
at 570. On the contrary, the Court found that Pickering's relationship with the board of educa-
tion and the superintendent was not the type of close working relationship where personal
loyalty and confidence are necessary to the proper functioning of their respective duties. Id.
Further, no evidence was presented that the harmony between Pickering and his co-workers
had been effected, nor was evidence presented as to the effect of the letter on the community
as a whole or the administration of the school system in particular. Id. at 567.
159. Id. at 571. The issue debated in Pickering concerned the financing of the local
school system. Id. In balancing the interests in favor of Pickering, the Court stated that "the
question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of legitimate public
concern." Id. "In a society that leaves such questions to popular vote, free and open debate is
vital to informed decision making by the electorate." Id. at 571-72. The Court then went on to
say that since teachers, as a class, are most likely to have the means to form informed and
definite opinions on how school funds should be allocated, "it is essential that they be able to
speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 572.
160. Note, supra note 55, at 223.
161. Id. Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 343-44 (Although the Court
emphasized the public context of Pickering's speech, this factor was not outcome-determina-
tive.); See also Note, New Restrictions, supra note 21, at 343 (public context in which em-
ployee's speech was made strengthened employee's right to speak).
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these factors in the final outcome of the Pickering decision, the Court did
not attempt to define what constituted a matter of public concern,162 nor
did the Court explicitly state that the context of the speech was a factor to
be weighed in balancing the competing interests.63 However, in 1983, in
Connick v. Myers,'" the Supreme Court attempted to define what consti-
tuted a matter of public concern' 65 and explicitly acknowledged that con-
text was a factor to be considered in determining whether the speech ad-
dresses a matter of public concern.'66
The dispute in Connick centered upon a questionnaire concerning the
internal operating procedures of a district attorney's office. Shortly after
being informed that she was being transferred to another department, My-
ers, one of the assistant district attorneys, prepared a questionnaire "con-
cerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance com-
mittee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees ever
felt pressured to work in political campaigns ." 67 Myers then distributed the
questionnaire to the other assistant district attorneys. Shortly thereafter,
Myers was fired for refusing to accept the proposed transfer.'68 Myers then
brought an action against Connick alleging that she was wrongfully dis-
charged for exercising her constitutionally protected right of free speech."6"
Although the district court and the court of appeals agreed with Myers and
ordered her reinstated,'17 0 the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that
162. Note, supra note 55, at 221.
163. Id. at 223; Note, Narrowing the Scope, supra note 21, at 343-44.
164. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
165. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 1I and accompanying text.
167. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41. The main reason Myers prepared the questionnaire
was because when she expressed concern over her proposed transfer, Dennis Waldron, one of
the first district attorneys, suggested that Myers' concerns were not shared by others in the
office. Id. at 141. Myers informed Waldron that she would do some research on the matter and
subsequently, she prepared and distributed the questionnaire. Id. See generally Note, Connick
v. Myers: A Matter for Public Concern, 29 Loy. L. REV. 1174 (1983) (for a general overview
of Connick and the Supreme Court cases leading up to tConnick).
168. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. Myers did not specifically refuse to accept the proffered
transfer. Id. When she was first informed about the possible transfer, Myers expressed her
concern that if she were transferred to the juvenile division, a possible conflict of interest could
arise. Id. at 140 n.l. Myers had previously participated in a counseling program for convicted
juvenile defendants. Id. If she was transferred, Myers could be faced with prosecuting
juveniles she had previously counseled. Id. Myers expressed this concern to her immediate
supervisor, Waldron, and to the District Attorney himself, Connick. Id. at 140-41. After Con-
nick urged Myers to accept the transfer, Myers replied that she would "consider" it. Id. at
141. Although Connick told Myers that she was being fired for not accepting the transfer, the
real reason for her firing was the questionnaire. Id. In reference to the questionnaire, Waldron
told Connick that Myers was creating a "mini-insurrection" within the office. Id.
169. Id. at 141.
170. Connick v. Myers, 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La.), afd, 654 F.2d 719 (1981). For an
excellent summary and analysis of both the district court's and the court of appeals' holdings
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Myers' speech did not address a matter of public concern; thus, the first
amendment did not protect her speech.'
In making its decision, the Connick Court relied heavily on the lan-
guage of Pickering"' and determined that federal courts should not get
involved in public employment disputes unless the employee's speech ad-
dresses a matter of public concern. 17 3 According to the Connick Court, the
only reason courts get involved in public employee discharge cases is to
ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental constitutional rights by
virtue of their public employment. 7 4 Thus, the threshold requirement for
courts to get involved in public employment cases is that the public em-
ployee's speech must address a matter of public concern.1 5
After reviewing Myers' questionnaire, the Court held that none of the
questions were of public import, 17 except for question number eleven, 177
which addressed the issue of official pressure upon employees to work for
political candidates. 78 Because of this question, the Connick Court engaged
in the Pickering balancing test to determine whether the first amendment
protected Myers' speechY.9
and reasoning, see Note, Delicate Balance, supra note 22, at 83-85.
171. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
172. Note, supra note 55, at 224. See also Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 ("[T]he repeated
emphasis in Pickering on the right of a public employee as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern, was not accidental. This language reflects both the historical evolve-
ment of the rights of public employees, and the common sense realization that government
offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.").
173. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wis-
dom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the em-
ployee's behavior.
Id. at 147.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 146.
176. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
177. Id. at 149. Question number eleven stated: "Do you ever feel pressured to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?" Id.
178. Id. The Supreme Court has held that official pressure upon employees to work for
political candidates not of the worker's own choice constitutes a coercion of belief in violation
of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. (citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980);
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)). The Supreme Court has also held that government
service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service. Connick,
461 U.S. at 149 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Pub. Workers v. Mitch-
ell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)).
179. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. Although the threshold requirement for courts to get
involved in public employment disputes is that the employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern, the first amendment does protect public employee's private speech. Id. at 147.
However, the employee's speech does not receive as much first amendment protection when it
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In Pickering, the Court noted that the inherent problem in all such
public employee cases was to arrive at a proper balance between the com-
peting interests of the public employee and the public employer.18 0 Analyz-
ing the Pickering elements,181 there was no demonstration in Connick that
Myers' questionnaire impeded her ability to perform her responsibilities, 82
but there was evidence that close working relationships were important to
the efficient operation of the district attorney's office. 18 3 Although no evi-
dence existed that Myers' questionnaire disrupted the office or destroyed
working relationships,' the Supreme Court held that Connick should be
given a wide degree of deference in managing his office. 8 5 Despite these
facts, the Supreme Court did not feel bound to strictly follow the Pickering
Court's analysis. 86 Instead, the Connick Court extracted the two most criti-
cal elements from Pickering, the right to comment on matters of public
concern and the context of the speech, 8 7 and incorporated them into a new
standard.
According to the new standard, the threshold requirement is that the
public employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern.188 In deter-
mining whether speech addresses a matter of public concern, courts must
look at the content, form, and context of the statement as revealed by the
whole record.' 89 Although the Connick Court made no attempt to define
"content, form, and context," the content factor relates to the subject mat-
ter of the speech, the form factor examines who the speech was conveyed
addresses a matter of private concern. Id. According to the Connick Court:
We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and
well-defined classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity,
that the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.
For example, an employee's false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public con-
cern may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a
libel action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street.
Id. (citations omitted).
180. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See supra notes 152-54 and
accompanying text (discussing how the Court balanced the competing interests).
181. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
182. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151 (1983). See also element number seven,
supra note 156.
183. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151. See also element number three, supra note 156.
184. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52. See also element number two, supra note 156.
185. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52. Connick testified that he believed Myers was trying
to disrupt the routine of the office with her questionnaire. Id. at 151 n.11.
186. Note, Supreme Court, supra note 51, at 836-37. See also Connick, 461 U.S. at 148
n.7, 150 n.10 (Since the inquiry into the protected status of speech is a question of law and the
Supreme Court is the final authority in determining the meaning of the Constitution, the
Court is compelled to examine for itself the statements in issue and the circumstances under
which they were made.).
187. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
188. Note, Supreme Court, supra note 51, at 836.
189. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983).
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to, and the context factor encompasses where and why the employee
spoke.190 In applying the standard, the Connick Court emphasized the fact
that Myers' questionnaire did not seek to gather any information about the
functioning of the district attorney's office that would be of use to the gen-
eral public in evaluating the performance of the district attorney's office.19
In other words, the content of Myers' questionnaire did not focus on any
matters open to public debate.
Another factor that weighed heavily in the Court's decision was the
fact that Myers did not intend to publicly disclose any of the information
from the questionnaire.' 91 Rather, the questionnaire was circulated to a
limited number of people and was intended to gather information for My-
ers' personal use only. Finally, the Court considered the context in which
the questionnaire arose.'9 While the questionnaire was responsive to the
current situation within the district attorney's office, the questionnaire was
not responsive to any issue open to public debate or any issue currently a
subject of public attention. Taken as a whole, Myers' questionnaire was
merely a continuation of her personal dispute with Connick, an expression
on a private matter which affected her and her alone. 94 Therefore, the
Connick Court held that the first amendment did not protect Myers'
speech. 9 5
In view of the historical purpose of the first amendment 9" in general
as well as the history of constitutional rights of public employees in particu-
lar,19 7 Connick was correctly decided. The first amendment was primarily
concerned and "fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social change."' 98 Myers' speech was merely
self-expression of a personal grievance which was not intended to bring
about any type of political or social change. Although one must look behind
the facts and holdings in Connick in order to find justification for the Su-
190. Note, Dismissal, supra note 157, at 370. See also Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-53
(The Court generally discusses nature of Myers' speech stating that subject matter, manner,
time, and place are all important factors the Court weighs to determine whether the speech
addresses a matter of public concern.). But see Connick, 461 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("Whether a particular statement by a public employee is addressed to a subject of public
concern does not depend on where it was said or why.").
191. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. See also Note, New Restrictions, supra note 14, at 349
(only information questionnaire would convey to public was that an employee was upset with
the status quo); Note, Dismissal, supra note 157, at 370 (purpose of questionnaire was to
continue employment dispute rather than to inform public of government wrongdoing).
192. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
193. Id. at 153-54.
194. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
195. Id. at 154.
196. See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text.
198. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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preme Court's holding that Myers' speech did not address a matter of pub-
lic concern,199 it is plausible that the Supreme Court correctly classified
Myers' speech as private speech.
C. Defamation: From New York Times to Dun & Bradstreet
In 1964, the Supreme Court revolutionized the field of defamation law
by giving defamatory statements constitutional protection in the landmark
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.00 Prior to 1964, defamatory
statements were generally considered to be one of the narrowly defined clas-
ses of speech unprotected by the first amendment.2 1 Before defamatory
statements attained constitutional status, they were governed by common
law principles.20 1
At common law, in order to establish a prima facie case in an action
for libel or slander 03 the plaintiff had to prove: 1) that the words com-
plained of were published of and concerning him; 2) that the words were
defamatory; and 3) that the defendant was responsible for publishing the
words.204 Once a plaintiff established a prima facie case in a libel action, he
did not have to prove that the publication caused damage, since damages
were presumed.20 5 In other words, the common law imposed strict liability
199. See supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
200. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court held that erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate and if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space
they need to survive, these statements must be protected. Id. at 271-72. The Court then went
on to hold that, "[t]he constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to his official con-
duct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
Most commentators consider New York Times a landmark decision of tremendous constitu-
tional significance. See, e.g., Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 193-94 (New York Times may
prove to be the most important first amendment decision the Supreme Court has ever
produced.).
201. Note, Evolution, supra note 47, at 774 (citing Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)).
202. Note, First Amendment, suqpra note 22, at 785.
203. A cause of action for defamation can take one of two forms: an action for libel or
an action for slander. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 111, at 771; Note, Survival of
Libel Actions-There is Life After Death in New Jersey, 15 SatON HALL L. REV. 639, 639
n.2 (1985). The distinction between the two different types of actions lies in the method of
publication, which can be either oral or written. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 112,
at 785. If a defamatory statement is communicated orally, a cause of action for slander exists,
while a written defamatory statement will give rise to an action for libel. Id.
204. C. DUNCAN & B. NEILL, DEFAMATION 22 (1978).
205. Id. Libel is per se actionable if the statement at issue is defamatory on its face.
Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:
An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1975). Slander is per se actionable only if
1989] 615
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on persons accused of defaming the plaintiff. This imposition of strict liabil-
ity can best be understood in light of the high value the common law placed
on an individual's reputation. 20 6
While strict liability was the norm, the common law did allow the def-
amation defendant some defenses.2"' For first amendment purposes, the
most notable defense at common law was the qualified privilege of "fair
comment."2 °0 Fair comment is the most notable defense because the back-
ground of New York Times lies in the general recognition, at common law,
of the fair comment privilege.2 09
The common law fair comment privilege, being a qualified privilege,
depends on the truth of the facts upon which the comment is based and
does not protect honest misstatements of facts.2 1 0 Unless the defendant
the statement falls into one of four narrowly drawn categories: the commission of a crime, the
contraction of a loathsome disease, a matter that would adversely affect the plaintiff's business,
or an accusation of unchastity if the plaintiff is a woman. Id. Libel per quod (libel not defama-
tory on its face) requires extrinsic proof of the statement's defamatory meaning unless the
written statement falls into one of the four categories of slander per se. Id. at 1354-55. Fur-
thermore, a per se action presumes damages to the plaintiff's reputation, while a per quod
action requires proof of special damages. See id. at 1355-56. See generally PROSSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 7, § 112, at 785-97 (detailing and explaining the various types of libel and
slander).
206. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1963). "The right of a man to the
protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Id. at 92-93 (opinion by Stewart, J.).
207. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971). At common law,
there were absolute privileges, which allowed the defendant to completely avoid all liability
when established, and qualified privileges. Qualified privileges had to be exercised in a reason-
able manner and for the proper purpose, or else the defendant's immunity was forfeited. Some
examples of absolute privileges include: judicial proceedings-judges, witnesses and counsel
were given absolute immunity in the carrying out of their respective functions in connection
with any judicial proceedings; legislative proceedings-members of legislative bodies were
given absolute immunity for acts done and statements made in the performance of their duties;
executive communications--certain executive officers were also given absolute immunity for
acts done and statements made in the discharge of their duties. Truth was also an absolute
defense. Id. § 114, at 776-85; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585-92A. The
most notable qualified privilege was the privilege to make fair comments on matters of public
concern. Since this privilege was qualified rather than absolute, the comment had to be based
on true facts. W. PROSSER, supra § 115, at 785; see also RESTATEMENT, supra §§ 594-98A.
See generally Comment, supra note 18, at 1172-73 (for a brief history of American defama-
tion law).
208. W. PROSSER, supra note 207, § 118, at 819. The fair comment privilege applied
when publications to the general public addressed matters of public concern. Id.
209. Id. See also Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 531 ("For first amend-
ment purposes the most important of these common law privileges was that of 'fair comment'
on matters of public concern.").
210. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267 (1964); see also Note, Consti-
tutional Law, supra note 22, at 531 (fair comment privilege protected statements of opinion
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could discharge the burden of truth, he became subject to general damages
without a showing of harm by the plaintiff."1 In New York Times, the
Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance between the common law of
defamation and the first amendment guarantee of free speech.212 In striking
the balance, the Court abolished the common law rule of strict liability
finding that it violated the first amendment. 213 In abolishing the rule of
strict liability, the Court expressly recognized that honest misstatements of
fact fall within the ambit of the first amendment's protection. 214
Although New York Times was originally a narrow decision, applying
only to public officials in the performance of their official duties, the Su-
preme Court eventually extended the New York Times rule to public
figures in 1967.215 In extending the scope of the New York Times rule to
but not honest misstatements of fact).
211. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 267.
212. Note, First Amendment, supra note 51, at 790. See also New York Times, 376
U.S. at 270-73 (generally discussing historical importance of first amendment, nature of at-
tacks on government and public officials, and fact that "erroneous statement is inevitable in
free debate").
213. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 268-69. In New York Times, an Alabama police
commissioner brought a defamation action against the New York Times for publishing an
advertisement alleging civil rights violations by the police department. Id. at 256. Although
the advertisement was substantially correct, the jury found liability on the basis of some rela-
tively minor inaccuracies. Id. at 256-58. Since Alabama's fair comment privilege only pro-
tected true statements, the jury's determination was proper. Id. at 263. However, as a result of
the jury's determination, the commissioner was awarded $500,000 in damages. Id. at 256. The
question before the Court in New York Times was whether the common law rule of strict
liability, as applied to a defamation action brought by a public official against a critic of his
official conduct, abridged the first amendment. Id. at 264-65. In holding that the rule violated
the first amendment, the Court stated that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate,
and if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space they need to survive, errone-
ous statements must be given constitutional protection. Id. at 271-72.
214. Id. at 273.
215. The Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard to public figures in the
consolidated opinion of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In extending the
actual malice standard to public figures, the Court observed that "public figures, like public
officials, often play an influential role in ordering 'society' and that many who do not hold
public office ... are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions." Id. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring). In separate opinions, Justice Black,
joined by Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, concurred in Chief
Justice Warren's rationale for applying the New York Times standard to public figures. Id. at
170, 172. The Court defined a public figure as an individual who thrusts himself into a public
controversy or who receives continuing public scrutiny and possesses the ability to rebut the
defamatory statement. Id. at 154-55 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion). The Supreme Court later
refined this test and recognized three types of public figures. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-13, at
643-44 (summarizing three categories of public figures). A person is "a public figure for all
purposes" if he has achieved "general fame or notoriety in the community." Gertz, 418 U.S. at
352. An individual may also be deemed a public figure if he "'voluntarily inject[s himself]
into a public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.'" L. TRIBE,
19891
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include public figures, the Court's primary focus was on the plaintiff's sta-
tus."' However, in 1971, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,217 the Su-
preme Court abruptly shifted its focus from the plaintiff's status to the na-
ture of the speech.2"8 In a highly criticized opinion,21 9 the Court suggested
that the actual malice test should extend to all defamation cases in which
the speech involved addressed a "subject of public or general interest. 220
Until Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court had engaged in a balancing test
in determining how much protection defamatory statements should be
given.21 1 The two competing interests that the Court weighed were the free-
dom of speech on the one side, and the individual's interest in protecting his
reputation and good name on the other.222 At common law, the scales were
arranged so that the individual's interest in protecting his reputation and
good name invariably outweighed virtually all statements tending to harm
that interest.2 s By placing defamatory statements within the realm of the
first amendment's protection, the Supreme Court attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the common law of defamation and the first amendment. 22'
supra §§ 12-13, at 644 (misquoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345) (the proper language is as follows:
"those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Gertz, 418 U.S. at
345). Finally, a person may become a public figure involuntarily. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
216. Comment, supra note 18, at 1174.
217. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
218. Note, First Amendment, supra note 22, at 793.
219. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (1976). See also Note, Constitutional Law, supra note
22, at 532 (Rosenbloom was a highly criticized opinion).
220. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43. In Rosenbloom, the plurality determined:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual
did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and
significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety ....
Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale magazine distributor or a "private"
businessman running a corner newsstand has no relevance in ascertaining whether the
public has an interest in the issue. We honor the commitment to robust debate on public
issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending constitutional protection
to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern, with-
out regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.
Id. at 43-44 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
221. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text and infra notes 222-25.
222. Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 527; Comment, supra note 18, at
1171.
223. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying note 7. The New York Times standard was designed
to prevent the self-censorship the common law rule of strict liability promoted. The standard
was also designed to give the first amendment "breathing space." New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964). Although the common law allowed "fair comment" on
matters of public concern, if any of the factual assertions contained in the comment were false,
the speaker became liable for uttering defamatory falsehoods. C. DUNCAN, supra note 204, at
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However, in striking the balance in Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court
overcompensated and extended the New York Times rule "to absurdity." 225
While tolerating some degree of abusive discourse is necessary to pro-
tect freedom of speech,22 the plurality's extension of the actual malice
standard to all "subjects of public or general interest" in Rosenbloom in-
vited too much abuse.227 After Rosenbloom, the scales became dispropor-
tionately tipped in favor of freedom of speech.228 The competing interest of
the individual's right to protect his reputation and good name was virtually
nonexistent. 229 It had been overshadowed by the all-encompassing first
amendment.230
In 1974, three years after Rosenbloom, the Supreme Court decided to
resurrect the individual's right to protect his reputation. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,2 31 the Court explicitly overruled the Rosenbloom "subjects of
62-64. In devising the actual malice standard, the Supreme Court recognized that "erroneous
statement[s are] inevitable in free debate." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72. This recog-
nition enabled the Court to modify the common law fair comment privilege in order to promul-
gate the concept that honest misstatements of fact fall within the ambit of the first amend-
ment's protections. Id.
225. Note, Evolution, supra note 47, at 780.
226. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271. As James Madison said, "Is]ome degree of
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more true
than in that of the press." Id. (citing 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
571 (1876)).
227. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
228. Id. at 346. "Nor does the Constitution require us to draw so thin a line between the
drastic alternatives of the New York Times privilege and the common law of strict liability for
defamatory error." Id.
229. Note, Evolution, supra note 47, at 780 (the effect of Rosenbloom was to imple-
ment a virtually absolute immunity to publishers of defamatory information since any matter
of sufficient general interest to prompt media coverage might be said to be a public concern).
230. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 62 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
As Justice Harlan so succinctly stated, "the principal failing of the plurality opinion is its
inadequate appreciation of the limitations imposed by the legal process in accommodating the
tension between state libel laws and the federal constitutional protection given to freedom of
speech and press." Id. See also Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 532-33 (Rosen-
bloom extended the actual malice standard to all libels involving "matters of public or general
concern." In Gertz, the Court noted that such an extension infringed "to an unacceptable
degree the state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation.").
231. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In Gertz, Elmer Gertz, a reputable lawyer, sued the publish-
ers of the American Opinion, Robert Welch, Inc., for publishing defamatory falsehoods about
him. Id. at 327. In 1968, a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a boy named
Nelson. Id. at 325. Nelson's family retained Gertz to represent them in a civil suit against
Nuccio. Id. The editorial staff of the American Opinion decided to write an article about the
criminal trial of Officer Nueeio. Id. In March of 1969, an article was published entitled
"FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War On Police." Id. at 325-26. Although the arti-
cle's main focus was the criminal trial against Nuccio (in which Gertz had no role), the article
characterized Gertz as an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy," a group
which has advocated the violent seizure of the U.S. Government. Id. at 326. The article also
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public or general interest" approach2 32 and revived the distinction between
public and private individuals.2 33 As a consequence of rejecting the Rosen-
bloom approach, the Gertz Court had to devise a new standard for private
plaintiffs.2" Instead of formulating a uniform standard, applicable to all
private plaintiffs, the Court decided to leave the question to the states.235
However, the Court did hold that the states may not impose liability with-
out fault.236 Further, if presumed and punitive damages were sought, the
plaintiff must prove actual malice.2 37
Although Gertz explicitly overruled the "subjects of public or general
labeled Gertz as a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter." Id. Most of the statements concern-
ing Gertz were false. Id. Although the jury returned a verdict for Gertz, the trial court entered
a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant. Id. at 329. The trial court held that the New York Times
actual malice standard applied to the case through the Court's decision in Rosenbloom. Id. at
329-30. Dissatisfied with the result in Gertz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 325
("We granted certiorari to reconsider the extent of a publisher's constitutional privilege
against liability for defamation of a private citizen."). In reversing the trial court, the Supreme
Court held that the extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plural-
ity abridged the states' legitimate interest in compensating private individuals for injury to
their reputations. Id. at 345-46. The Court also explicitly overruled the Rosenbloom "subjects
of public or general interest" test. Id.
232. Id. Although the Gertz Court enunciated several reasons for rejecting the Rosen-
bloom public interest test in favor of focusing on the plaintiff's status, one of the main reasons
was the Court's dissatisfaction with the ad hoc nature of the test. Id. at 346. See also Com-
ment, supra note 18, at 1178 (Gertz "rejected the Rosenbloom approach by reviving the dis-
tinction between public and private individuals."); Note, First Amendment, supra note 22, at
794-95 (level of protection depends upon plaintiff's status because the state has strong interest
in protecting individual's reputation which outweighs defendant's first amendment rights);
Note, Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 533 (Court shifted focus back to individual's
status); Note, Evolution, supra note 47, at 781-82 (Rosenbloom, public or general interest
test, did not adequately balance competing values at stake; status of plaintiff is the proper
focus).
233. Comment, supra note 18, at 1178. In drawing the distinction between public and
private individuals, the Gertz Court reasoned that since private individuals have less access to
the channels of effective communication, private individuals are more vulnerable to injury.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. The Gertz Court also recognized that generally public officials and
public figures have assumed influential roles in ordering society. Id. at 345. As a result, public
individuals run the risk of closer scrutiny. Id. A private individual, on the other hand, does not
usually assume an influential role in ordering society. Id. Therefore, the private individual has
not relinquished his interest in the protection of his reputation and good name. Id. at 344-45.
234. Id. at 345-46. Under the Rosenbloom approach, private plaintiffs had to prove ac-
tual malice, if the defamatory statements involved a subject of public or general interest, in
order to prevail. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971). By rejecting the
Rosenbloom approach, the Gertz Court created a void in the area of defamation actions
brought by private plaintiffs. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47.
235. Id. at 347. In leaving the question to the states, the Gertz Court explicitly recog-
nized the strength of the state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury
to their reputation. Id. at 348.
236. Id. at 347.
237. Id. at 349.
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interest" test, 38 traces of the test reappeared in 1985, when the Supreme
Court decided Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders.39 In yet an-
other attempt to ease the inherent tension between the individual's interest
in protecting his reputation and the first amendment's interest in unfettered
debate,240 the Dun & Bradstreet Court held that the first amendment per-
mits recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a showing of actual
malice if the defamatory statement does not address a "matter of public
concern."241 Like Gertz, Dun & Bradstreet involved a private plaintiff. De-
spite this apparent similarity, the Dun & Bradstreet Court found Gertz to
be inapplicable 42 and made a distinction between speech on matters of
public concern and purely private speech. 243
The speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet was a credit report Dun &
Bradstreet issued to five of its subscribers. 44 The report falsely stated that
238. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
239. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
240. See generally Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders: "Matters of
Private Concern Give Libel Defendant's Lowered First Amendment Protection", 35 CATH.
U.L. REV. 883 (1986) (discussing generally the Court's struggle to balance individual's
reputational interests against first amendment's interest in free flow of ideas; how plaintiff's
burden of proof effects the level of first amendment protection a particular statement receives;
and how the Dun & Bradstreet Court's focus on the type of speech at issue, rather than the
plaintiff's status, upsets the balance and lowers the defendant's first amendment protection).
241. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751. See generally Note, The Supreme Court Cre-
ates New Hurdle For Libel Defendants: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
60 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 144 (1985) (comparing Gertz to Dun & Bradstreet).
242. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761. Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, stated
that the question presented in Dun & Bradstreet was whether the rule established in Gertz
(that presumed and punitive damages may not be awarded unless the plaintiff shows actual
malice) applied when the false and defamatory statements do not address a matter of public
concern. Id. at 751.
243. Id. at 756-60. The Court justified the distinction between public and private speech
by stating "[n]othing in our opinion [in Gertz] ... indicated that this same balance would be
struck regardless of the type of speech involved." Id. at 756-57. The Court also indicated that
it had not considered the question of whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory
statements involve purely private speech. Id. at 757. Further, in making the distinction be-
tween public and private speech, the Dun & Bradstreet Court noted that the nature of the
speech was important in determining the amount of first amendment protection defamatory
statements will be given. Id. at 755-56. Thus, like the Rosenbloom Court, the Dun & Brad-
street Court believed that the nature of the speech was an important factor to be reckoned
with in balancing the competing interests. Id. See also supra notes 217-25 and accompanying
text. However, unlike the Rosenbloom Court, the Dun & Bradstreet Court held that the na-
ture of the speech was only one of several factors to be considered in defamation cases. Dun &
Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-62. Thus, even though traces of the Rosenbloom approach reap-
peared in Dun & Bradstreet, the Court did not completely abandon the status-oriented ap-
proach of Gertz. Id. at 756-58. For a definition of private speech see supra note 16.
244. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985). Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. is a credit reporting agency that provides subscribers with financial and re-
lated information. Id. All the information is confidential; under the terms of the subscription
agreement, the subscribers may not reveal the information to anyone else. Id.
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Greenmoss Builders had filed for bankruptcy.245 Greenmoss immediately
contacted Dun & Bradstreet and asked for a correction after being in-
formed of the defamatory report.2 6 Greenmoss also requested the names of
the firms that had received the false reports. 247 Although Dun & Bradstreet
promptly sent notices of the error to the five subscribers, Dun & Bradstreet
refused to divulge the subscribers' names to Greenmoss. 245 As a conse-
quence of not divulging the names, Greenmoss brought a defamation action
against Dun & Bradstreet. 49
After making the distinction between public and private speech, the
Court determined that the credit report did not address a matter of public
concern.150 In making this determination, the Court borrowed the standard
enunciated in Connick v. Myers25' and stated that whether the speech ad-
dressed a matter of public concern must be determined by the statement's
content, form, and context.252 As in Connick, the Court did not attempt to
define content, form, and context;253 consequently, the Court perpetuated
the uncertainty created in Connick.2 4
Like the Connick Court, the Dun & Bradstreet Court emphasized sev-
eral factors which weighed heavily in its determination.2 55 One such factor
was the report's content. 256 Since the report was speech solely in the interest
of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. and its specific business audience, the report did
not address a matter open to public debate.217 Also, the report's limited
245. Id. The error in the credit report had been caused when one of Dun & Bradstreet's
employees, a seventeen year old high school student who was paid to review Vermont bank-
ruptcy proceedings, inadvertently attributed to Greenmoss a bankruptcy petition filed by one
of Greenmoss' former employees. Id. at 752.
246. Id. at 751. Greenmoss learned of the report from his banker. Id.
247. Id. at 751-52.
248. Id. The notice stated that one of Greenmoss' former employees, not Greenmoss
Builders, had filed for bankruptcy. The notice also stated that Greenmoss "continued in busi-
ness as usual." Id. at 752.
249. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 752 (1985).
250. Id. at 762-63.
251. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For a discussion of Connick, see supra notes 164-95 and
accompanying text.
252. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
253. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 784-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Without explain-
ing what is a 'matter of public concern,' the plurality opinion proceeds to serve up a smorgas-
bord of reasons why the speech at issue here is not [of public concern]." Id. at 785. See also
Note, Punitive Damages in Private Speech Defamation: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 1986 B.Y.U.L. REV. 233, 243 (quoting Justice Brennan's language).
254. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also supra text accompanying notes
50-52.
255. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985).
256. Id. at 761.
257. Id. at 762. "There is simply no credible argument that this type of credit report
requires special protection to ensure that 'debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust
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distribution indicated that the report's form was private268-- the report was
not designed to disclose useful information to the general public. Finally,
the Court noted that the report was prepared and disseminated because of
Dun & Bradstreet's desire for profit.25 9 In other words, the report's context
was not responsive to any issue currently being debated in the marketplace
of ideas. Thus, since the content, form, and context of the report did not
address a matter of public concern, the report was not entitled to first
amendment protection.6 0
The four dissenters in Dun & Bradstreet believed that the "matter of
public concern" test was too reminiscent of the "subjects of public or gen-
eral interest" test which Gertz overruled. 261 While the dissent's point is well
taken, the follies of the current content, form, and context standard can be
remedied by clearly defining the terms content, form, and context.2 62
IV. CONTENT, FORM, AND CONTEXT DEFINED: A PROPOSAL
Relying on the Supreme Court's past first amendment decisions, cer-
tain guidelines can be established so the courts and the public can more
reasonably determine what constitutes a matter of public concern. However,
before these guidelines are set forth with any specificity, some preliminary
definitions must be given. A public concern can be defined as a matter of
interest or importance that relates to or affects the people as a whole.26 3
Content relates to the subject matter of the speech and embraces all that is
contained in or dealt with in a particular expression.2 6 4 Form examines how
the speech is conveyed, 26 5 and context encompasses where and why a partic-
ular statement was made.266 In light of these general definitions, this note
proposes a two-tiered analysis to the content, form, and context standard.
and wide-open.'" Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
258. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762. "[I]t cannot be said that the report involves
any 'strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.'" Id. at 762 (citing Virginia
Citizens Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
259. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (profit is a force less likely to be deterred than
others).
260. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985).
261. Id. at 778-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Most commentators also disagree with the
majority's logic for the same reason. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
262. The very purpose of this note is to define the terms content, form, and context. See
supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
263. Public has been defined as "of, belonging to, or concerning the people as a whole;
of or by the community at large." WEaSraR's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1148 (2d ed. 1982).
Concern has been defined as "a matter of interest or importance to one; that which relates to
or affects one; affair; matter; business." Id. at 293.
264. Id. at 307.
265. Id. at 548.
266. Id. at 307.
1989]
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The first tier of the analysis focuses on the content of the speech. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, speech dealing with matters of public con-
cern occupies "the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment val-
ues. ' 67 Furthermore, since the Supreme Court's main concern in protecting
freedom of speech has centered around the idea "that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, wide-open and robust,"2 68 it is logical to first
examine all that is contained in or dealt with in a particular expression in
deciding the public concern issue. Finally, according to Justice Brennan,
"whether a particular statement ... is addressed to a subject of public
concern does not depend on where it was said or why."' 69 Thus, in applying
the content, form, and context standard, courts should first look to the
statement's content to determine whether the speech addresses a matter of
public concern.
In defining the term content, it must be remembered that freedom of
speech has never been limited to matters bearing broadly on issues of re-
sponsible government.270 The framers of the Constitution believed that free-
dom of speech should advance truth, science, morality, and the arts in gen-
eral, as well as responsible government.2 71 Further, if freedom of speech is
to fulfill its historic function, it must embrace all issues about which infor-
mation is needed to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period.2 72
In light of these principles, the content of a particular statement in-
volves a matter of public concern when the essential meaning or substance
of the speech addresses some issue currently being debated in the market-
place of ideas, be it political, social, cultural or scientific. However, in de-
termining whether a particular statement addresses an issue currently being
debated in the marketplace of ideas, courts must avoid the temptation of
equating public controversy with all controversies of interest to the public.
267. NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (emphasis added).
268. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added).
269. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 160 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan went on to state, "[t]he First Amendment affords special protection to speech that
may inform public debate about how society is to be governed-regardless of whether it actu-
ally becomes the subject of public controversy." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 786-91 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(where Justice Brennan reiterates his belief that the content of the statement is the most im-
portant element of the content, form, and context standard); Casenote, The De-Constitutional-
ization of Defamation Law-Is It Really That Far Of., 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 279, 334-36
(discussing Justice Brennan's content-based first amendment hierarchy and advocating for its
adoption in combination with a declaratory judgment action); Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d
293, 296 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e believe that the content factor is most important in making
this determination.").
270. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 42 (1971).
271. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967).
272. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
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For example, debate over the financing of a local school system can be
characterized as addressing a matter currently being debated in the mar-
ketplace of ideas because the resolution of the issue will have a general
impact on all members of the community.273 But, debate over an issue such
as the reasons why a famous couple got a divorce would not be the sort of
public controversy characterized as addressing an issue currently being de-
bated in the marketplace of ideas. 27' Although such speech may be of inter-
est to some members of society, the resolution of the issue is of no conse-
quence to the members of the general public. Thus, the key factor courts
must focus on in determining whether the content of a particular statement
addresses a matter of public concern is the potential impact the statement
has on the general public.
If the public concern issue can be resolved based on the content of a
particular statement, the court's analysis should end. However, if the state-
ment's content is not dispositive of the issue, courts should then proceed to
the second tier of the analysis. The second tier focuses on the remaining two
factors of the public concern standard: form and context. These two factors
should be examined together and given equal weight.
In analyzing the form of the speech, courts should look at how the
speech has been communicated. If the speech has been publicly dissemi-
nated, either orally or in writing, the speech should receive more protection
than speech that has not been publicly disseminated.2 7 5 The second factor
courts should examine concerning the statement's form is the extent of the
statement's dissemination. Arguably, the greater the dissemination, the
greater the protection. Thus, speech designed to gather or distribute infor-
mation in an attempt to resolve an issue currently being debated in the
public forum should be granted more protection than speech seeking infor-
273. See generally Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
274. See generally Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (Divorce proceedings of
famous couple "is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though the
marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the
reading public.").
275. For example, if a particular statement is made to a group of people or published in
some type of publication, the statement's form is presumably public. However, if the same
statement is made during a private conversation or written in a personal letter, the statement's
form is presumably private.
It is important to remember that according to the two-tiered analysis, the form of the
speech is only considered when the statement's content is not dispositive of the public concern
issue. See generally Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). In Rankin, a deputy con-
stable was fired for saying "if they go for him again, I hope they get him," in regards to the
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan. Id. at 2895. Although the statement was
made during a private conversation, the Court held that the statement addressed a matter of
public concern. Id. The Court based its holding on the fact that the content of the statement
addressed a matter of public concern. Id. at 2898. "The statement was made in the course of a
conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration." Id. at 2897.
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mation for the speaker's personal benefit. 7
Finally, in analyzing the context of the speech, courts should look at
the speaker's motivation for making the statements. Statements made in the
speaker's personal best interest should generally be given less protection
than speech made on behalf of resolving an issue currently in the market-
place of ideasY.17 Courts should also examine the speech's responsiveness to
issues currently in the public marketplace of ideas. For example, speech
concerning a recent budget proposal should be given more protection than
speech addressing an issue that has already been resolved. In other words,
speech that could potentially have an impact on the general public should
receive greater protection than speech that is more academic in nature.
In following these general guidelines, courts can more accurately deter-
mine whether a particular statement addresses a matter of public concern.
These guidelines also give potential litigants a clearer understanding of
when their speech will be protected and when their speech will subject them
to the consequences associated with purely private speech. Finally, these
guidelines clarify the current standard and eliminate some of the problems
the current standard's inherent vagueness has caused.17 8
V. CONCLUSION
In an area so closely touching one of our most precious freedoms, the
freedom of speech, precision of regulation must be the touchstone. The is-
sue of whether or not a particular statement addresses a matter of public
concern is critical to the public employee and the defamation defendant.
Currently, the issue of whether a statement addresses a matter of public
concern is judged by the statement's content, form, and context. As this
note demonstrates, this standard is inherently vague. As a result of this
vagueness, public employees and would-be speakers cannot reasonably de-
termine when the first amendment will protect their speech. Consequently,
public employees' speech may be unnecessarily chilled by the possibility of
retaliatory discharges. Likewise, in the area of defamation law, many
276. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (speech did not attempt to resolve
public controversy; speech made for speaker's personal benefit).
277. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)
(Credit report "was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific busi-
ness audience.").
278. See generally Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 840-42 (7th Cir. 1985) (Content
of public employee's speech would generally be considered as private speech. However, in light
of the speech's context and form, the court determined that the speech addressed a matter of
public concern.).
The court's reasoning in Knapp lends support to the two-tiered analysis this note proposes.
Because the court could not dispose of the public concern issue based on the content of the
statement at issue, the court turned to the context and form of the statement. Id.
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would-be speakers may be silenced for fear of unrestrained presumed and
punitive damages.
To clarify the issue of what type of speech addresses a matter of public
concern, certain guidelines must be adopted. The guidelines outlined in this
note have been formulated in light of the first amendment's historical pur-
pose and in an attempt to properly balance the inherent problems associ-
ated with all first amendment cases. Finally, these guidelines will enable the
courts and the public to more accurately determine what constitutes a mat-
ter of public concern and thus protected speech.
NADINE RENEE DAHM
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